Schoger v. State Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 35917 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
5-22-2008
Schoger v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
35917
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Schoger v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 35917" (2008). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2290.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2290
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 








S.Ct. No. 33976 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth 
Judicial District of the Slate of Idaho 
Ln and For the County of Ada 
HONORABLE JOEL D. HORTON, 
District Judge 
Dennis Benjamin Lawrence Wasden 
ISBA# 4199 IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
303 West Bannock Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 2772 Criminal Law Division 
Boise, ID 83701 P.O. BOX 83720 
(208) 343-1000 Boise, ID 83720-0010 
(208) 334-2400 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I. Table of Authorities 11 
II. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1 
A. S u m a r v  Dismissal was Inappropriate Because There was a Genuine Issue of 
Material Fact as to Whether Trial Counsel's Ineffective Assistance Resulted in Preiudice 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  toMs.Schoger. 2
B. Summary Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because the District Court Abused Its 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Discretion ill Refusinrr to Acceot Ms. Schoger's Guiltv Plea 3 
1 .  The argument that the District Court erred in refising to accept the proffered 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  guilty plea was preserved for appeal. . 3  
2. The Court did not have discretion to reject the knowing, intelligent and voluntaiy 
pleaofMs.Schoger. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4 
C. Summary Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because There Were Issues of Disouted 
. . . . . . . . . .  Material Fact as to the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim. 7 
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
I . TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
.... Sparrow v . State. 102 Idaho 60. 625 P.2d 414 (1981). citing Avord. supra (emphasis added) 7 
................................................................... State v Coffin. 104 Idaho 543. 661 P.2d 328 (1983) 6 
................................................................ . State v Hawkins. 117 Idaho 285. 787 P.2d 271 (1990) 6 
. State v . Horkley. 125 Idaho 860. 876 P.2d 142 (Ct . App 1994) .................................................. 7 
. State v . Peterson. 126 Idaho 522. 887 P.2d 67 (Ct . App 1994) ............................................... 6 
State v . Wilkins. 125 Idaho 215. 868 P.2d 1231 (1994) .............................................................. 6 
Sun Valley Potato Growers. Inc . v . Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761. 86 P.3d 475 (2004) .. 5 
MISCELLANEOUS 
Through the Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There. 1871 1 
11. INTRODUCTION 
"The time has come," the Walrus said, 
"To talk of many things: 
Of shoes--and ships-and sealing-wax- 
Of cabbages--and kings- 
And why the sea is boiling hot- 
And whether pigs have wings." 
And whether Courts can force a lass 
to suffer five more years: 
And pay ten thousand oysters more 
and cry that many tears 
Because the Court can find no facts 
to base a guilty plea - 
When state, defense and jurors twelve 
all say to it, "There be!" 
Italicized portion from "The Walrus and The Carpenter," by Lewis Carroll (from Through the 
Looking-Glass and What Alice Found There, 1871). Illustration by John Tenniel. 
The State asks the Court to fall through the looking glass by adopting the perplexing 
proposition that the District Court should not have accepted the proffered guilty plea for lack of a 
factual basis even though the state's prosecutor, the defendant, defense counsel and, eventually, 
twelve jurors all believed there was such a basis. The District Court's wrongful refi~sal to accept 
Ms. Schoger's plea to the lesser charge resulted in her being convicted of a more serious offense, 
sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment and be burdened with a greater fine than what would 
have occurred pursuant to the plea agreement. However, Ms. Schoger, unlike Alice, will not 
awaken at the end of the story to discover it was all just a dream. Rather, the State asks this 
Court to require Ms. Schoger to continue to live in the State's topsy-turvy world for many more 
years. This Court should reject the State's arguments for the reasons set forth below 
111. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. Summary Dismissal was Inappropriate Because There was a Genuine 
Issue of Material Fact as to Whether Trial Counsel's Ineffective Assistance 
Resulted in Preiudice to Ms. Schoger. 
Ms. Schoger argued in her opening brief that the District Court should have held an 
evidentiary hearing on the question of whether trial counsel's failure to explain the meaning of 
constructive possession prejudiced Ms. Schoger. To this the State answers that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact because "Schoger never alleged, or presented evidence to make a 
pvima facie showing, that she misunderstood the court's questions or that she would have given 
different answers to those questions had her attorney explained constructive possession." Brief 
of Respondent, pg. 5-6 (emphasis in original). This argument, however, is refuted by the record. 
First, the verified pro se post-conviction petition alleged facts raising an issue of material 
fact. Ms. Schoger alleged that 
I feel that Mr. Bamum had failed to infonn me and guide me through the process 
of taking a plea agreement. When the offer was made, Mr. Bamum did not 
explain the process or explain the type of questions I would be asked by the Judge. 
CR 7. She goes on to allege that Mr. Bamum told the District Court that a plea agreement had 
been reached, but did not prepare her for the plea colloquy before Court came back into session. 
She also alleged that she did not understand the difference between actual possession and 
constructive possession and accordingly told the judge the amount which she actually possessed. 
She also alleged that Mr. Bamum did not explain the difference between constructive and actual 
possession to her until after the District Court had rejected the plea agreement &d that she 
believes that the Court would have accepted her plea had she been properly advised. CR 9. 
Second, Paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition alleged that trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to advise her of the "elements necessary to establish Trafficking in 
Methamphetamine by 'constructive possession' or 'dominion and control' as defined under I.C. 
37-2732B or applicable Idaho case law. The Petitioner alleges that the lack of effective counsel 
lead to confusion and prompted the court to reject her guilty plea, although a factual and legal 
basis was tendered." CR 18. 
Third, the State in its Answer to Amended Petition denied "the Petitioner was not aware 
of the elements necessary to establish Trafficking in Methamphetamine." CR 40. It fkrtller 
"[nleither admits or denies the Court rejected the Petitioner's attempted plea as a result of the 
confusion alleged to be caused by trial counsel." CR 40. The State's answers to Ms. Schoger's 
allegations created a gcnuine issue of matelial fact as to whether Ms. Schoger was confused 
about the meaning of the tern1 of art "possession" when she was asked whether she possessed 
200 grams of methamphetamine. The State should not be permitted to argue to the contrary on 
appeal. 
3. Summary Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because the District Court 
Abused Its Discretion in Refusing to Accept Ms. Schoger's Guiltv Plea. 
The District Court abused its discretion in refusing to accept her proffered guilty plea. 
1.  The argument that the District Court erred in refusing to accept the 
proffered guiltyplea was preserved for appeal. 
The state's claim that Ms. Schoger did not preserve her argument that she has a right to 
plead guilty is without merit. In the Amended Petition, paragraph 7 alleges that the trial abused 
its discretion when it rejected her guilty plea as she "admitted to knowledge that the 
meth[amphetamine] was in the house, that such possession was a crime, and that her plea was 
free and voluntary." CR 18. This is the argument which is now made on appeal, i.e., once the 
requirements of ICR 11 (c)(l)-(5) have been satisfied, the District Court must accept a plea of 
guilty. Paragraph 8 alleges the Court erred by refusing to accept the AEford plea by "refus[ing] to 
conduct any further inquiry of the factual basis, or to conduct any analysis of whether her plea 
was appropriate under [North Carolina] AFord[.ln CR 18. Paragraph 13 also alleges that "the 
district court abused its discretion in rejecting her guilty plea on the facts as tendered[.]" CR 19. 
Further, at the argument on the state's motion for summary disposition, Ms. Schoger's counsel 
argued that the Court should have accepted the plea because "there is a substantial factual basis 
that supported her plea." PCP T., pg. 41, In. 4-6. Finally, Ms. Schoger argued that "[iln this 
case, Petitioner contends that there was an ample factual basis tendered to the court to establish 
control, nexus, possession of a controlled substance. Although the defendant was reluctant to 
admit cornplete control over the controlled substances in the house, such control is not required 
under Idaho Law. Under these circumstances, Petitioner contends the court exceeded its 
discretion in rejecting her plea, and that this issue should have been examined on appeal." Supp. 
CP - (Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition lo Summary Disposition, pg. 6-7). 
Likewise, on appeal, Ms. Schoger does not contend that the District Courts do not have 
discretion to reject a plea which does not conform to ICR 11, but rather contends that when ICR 
11 is complied with, as here, the Court is required to accept the plea, even if the Court believes 
there may be a defense to the charge. Accordingly, this Court should find the issue was properly 
preserved for appeal. 
2. The Court did not have discretion to reject the knowing, intelligent and 
voluntary plea of Ms. Schoger. 
A trial court abuses its discretion if it (1) does not correctly perceive the issue as 
discretionary, or (2) does not act within the bounds of discretion or fails to apply the correct legal 
standards, or (3) fails to reach the decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Potato 
Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761,765,86 P.3d 475,482 (2004) 
Thus, it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to reject the plea here because the Court 
found that the guilty plea met all the prerequisites for acceptance of a plea listed in ICR 1 l(c)(l)- 
(5). Tpg. 102, In. I - pg. I l l  In. 9. 
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Schoger based upon what you've told me, then, I find 
you understand the potential consequences of your decision to plead guilty. I find 
that your plead of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally, that you committed 
the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity greater than 200 grams. 
Do you agree with those finding? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
T pg. 1 1 1, In. 10-1 9. Moreover, defense counsel made a statement to the Court. 
Judge, with regard to the methamphetamine that was in the house, primarily Mr. 
Davis was the person that was handling that methamphetamine. Ms. Schoger 
indicates that he would keep it hidden Erom Ms. Schoger. However, she did 
reside in the residence, and we strongly believe that the state is going to he able to 
prove constructive possession if this matter does proceed to trial. 
And so with respect to the quantity that is within the house, Ms. Schoger admits to 
constructively possessing that and would ask the court to proceed forward with 
her plea in terms of the 200 grams or more. 
T pg. 113, pg.2, In. 22 - pg. 113, in. 5. Of course, the grand jury found there was probable cause 
for the charge of Ms. Schoger possessing 400 grams, the State obviously believed there was a 
factual basis for the charge and the petit jury later found there was proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Once the Court found all the required factors, the Court did not have the authority to 
reject the proffered plea. As the State frankly admits, there is no general requirement that the 
trial court must establish a factual basis for the crimes charged prior to accepting a guilty plea. 
State v. Colyin, 104 Idaho 543,545,661 P.2d 328,330 (1983); State v. Peterson, 126 Idaho 522, 
524,887 P.2d 67,69 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. I-lawkins, 1 1  7 Idaho 285,290,787 P.2d 271,276 
(1990). Therefore, in light of Ms. Schoger's right under the Court Rule to enter aplea of guilty, 
the District Court did not have the authority to reject the guilty plea for the failure of Ms. 
Schoger to provide a sufficient factual basis. 
It is no answer to the above to note, as the State does, that "a court must establish a 
factual basis when the defendant refuses to admit his participation in the crime or continues to 
assert his innocence." Respondent's Brief, pg. 9. The District Court entered into an extended 
colloquy with Ms. Schoger, after which it found that the guilty plea met all the prerequisites for 
acceptance of a plea listed in ICR 1 l(c)(l)-(5). T. Vol. I, pg. 102, in. 1 - pg. 11 1 in. 9. 
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Schoger based upon what you've told me, then, I find 
you understand the potential consequences of your decision to plead guilty. I find 
that your plead of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally, that you committed 
the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity greater than 200 grams. 
Do you agree with those finding? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
T. Vol. I, pg. 11 1, in. 10-19. In light of Ms. Schoger's answers to the Court's questions and the 
Court's findings, it did not need to obtain a factual basis for the offense. 
While it is true that the "district court may, as part of the plea colloquy, inquire of the 
Defendant 'to establish a factual basis for accepting [the guilty plea],' " Respondent's Brief, pg. 
9, quoting Stare IJ. Wilkins, 125 Idaho 215,217-218,868 P.2d 123 1, 1233-34 (1994), it does not 
follow that a plea may be rejected if the defendant's statements do not establish a factual basis. 
In fact, "[t[he reason for such an inquiry. . . is not to satisfy the court that the defendant is indeed 
guilty of the crime. Instead, such an inquiry should serve to indicate that the plea is knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily being entered by the defendant, despite his or her continuing claim 
of innocence or inability to recall the facts of the incident." State v. Horkley, 125 Idaho 860, 
862-63, 876 P.2d 142, 144-145 (Ct. App. 1994). Even in those cases where a factual basis is 
required, it does not need to come from the defendant. "As long as there is a strong factual basis 
for the plea, and the defendant understands the charges against him, a voluntary plea of guilty 
may be accepted by the court despite a continuing claim by the defendant that he zs innocent." 
Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60,61,625 P.2d 414,415 (1981), czting AEford, supra. (emphasis 
added). In this case, no factual basis was needed and the Court did not have the discretion to 
reject the plea. But even if one were needed, it did not have to come from Ms. Schoger and the 
District Court never asked defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney to present a factual basis 
before rejecting the plea. 
C. Summary Dismissal Was Ina~pro~r iate  B cause There Were Issues of Disputed 
Material Fact as to the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim. 
As shown above, the argument that the District Court should have accepted the guilty 
plea is meritorious. Appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal constituted 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Contray to the State's claim that appellate counsel 
was not required to raise a "novel theory," the argument is based upon the plain language of ICR 
1 l(a) that "[a] defendant may plead guilty or not guilty" and the requirements for the acceptance 
of a guilty plea found in subsection (c)(l)-(5). Further, it is well-established law that a court 
need not inquire as to the factual basis of a plea in all cases and the defendant is never required to 
be the one who provides the factual basis in those cases where one is required. There is nothing 
novel about applying the appropriate court rule and well-established case law to the facts of the 
case, especially when the District Court's failure to do so resulted in a doubling of the fixed 
portion of Ms. Schoger's sentence. Any reasonably competent appellate counsel would have 
done so. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Ms. Schoger respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district 
court's order sumlnarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further 
proceedings. a 
2:: of May, 2008 Respectfully submitted this -
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